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The demise of the biological weapons
capability of the United States in 1969 and the
advent of the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Convention in 1972 caused governments in the
West to go to sleep to the possibility of biological
weapons development throughout the rest of the
world, as technically knowledgeable workers
were transferred and retired, intelligence desks
were closed down, and budgets were cut. By
1979, despite the Sverdlovsk anthrax release, a
senior British government policy official de-
scribed any biological weapons threat as
nebulous. President Nixons biological weapons
disarmament declaration in 1969 had conveyed
the impression that biological weapons were
uncontrollable and that the U.S. program had
not been successful in producing usable weapons
(when in fact the opposite was true). Add to this
the rise of truly intercontinental ballistic missile
delivery of nuclear weapons, and the stage was
set for what I have termed nuclear blindness
and defined as the tunnel vision suffered by
successive governments, brought on by the
mistaken belief that it is only the size of the bang
that matters. Throughout this period, both the
former Soviet Union and Iraq conceived, albeit in
different ways, their new biological weapons
programs. It took until 1989-1991 for govern-
ment technical experts in the West to persuade
the world and their own governments that these
programs were real and of enormous potential
importance to the security of the West, if not the
whole world.
Too many times in the past we have failed to
anticipate future developments; refused to think
the unthinkable and expect the unexpected. Too
many times we have been out maneuvered by
those who take the time to think and plan and do
not simply rely on reacting to events. We must
learn to think like our potential adversaries if we
are to avoid conflict or blunt an attack, because
only superior thinking and planning (not just
better technology) will enable us to survive
biological warfare.
The Former Soviet Union
The origins of the biological weapons
program of the former Soviet Union stretch back
to statements by Lenin, and experimental work
was under way by the late 1920s. The modern era
was ushered in, however, only with the postwar
military building program, which established
infrastructure for research, development, test-
ing, production, and delivery of a variety of
agents and weapons.
On the other side of the globe, the allied
biological weapons program had grown from the
fledgling efforts of British research into anthrax
and the development of the World War II
anthrax cattlecake retaliation weapon into a
large U.S.-based research and development
(R&D) and production capability. By 1969, the
U.S. military had accepted seven type-classified
agents, and, at plants such as the one at Pine
Bluff in Arkansas, they could produce 650 tons of
agent per month for filling into weapons. This
thriving offensive program was unilaterally
abandoned in 1969 as a result of a complicated
mixture of politics, secret intelligence informa-
tion, new technological developments, and the
Vietnam War. These developments gave impetus
to the creation of the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention, originally drafted by the
British but finalized by the Soviet Union.
Although the Soviet Union signed the Conven-
tion at its inception in 1972, it did not believe that
the United States would be so foolish as to
abandon its biological weapons capability,
regarding the disarmament agreement as a
worthless piece of paper.
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In 1973 and 1974, the Soviet Politburo
formed and funded the organization known most
recently as Biopreparat (Chief Directorate for
Biological Preparations), designed to carry out
offensive biological weapons R&D and produc-
tion concealed behind legal and civil biotechnol-
ogy research. At no time did civilian biotechnol-
ogy work ever comprise much more than 15% of
the activity at any of the 52 sites under the aegis
of Biopreparat. Ultimately it was controlled by
the Ministry of Defense, the Military Industrial
Commission, and other state organs, all the way
up to the Central Committee and what became
eventually the Office of the President. Its head, a
general, retained special access to the Central
Committee from its inception, and through its
links with the Academies of Science and Medical
Science, Ministry of Health, and the Anti-Plague
Institutes, recruited a generation of scientists
who elsewhere in the world underpinned the
expanding pharmaceutical and biotechnology
industries and academic life-sciences research.
The whole system probably employed at its
height at least 50,000 people, many of whom
were scientists and technicians with very high
security clearance that identified them as part of
a biological weapons program more closely held
and more secret than its nuclear weapons
counterpart. The system was always able to draw
on the best from any source but was, to a certain
extent, self-sufficient. Not all of the 52
establishments were occupied with microbiology
or weaponssome were workshops, garages,
and cover operations; others supported the
program directly with fermenter design and
construction or building of weapons test
chambers; while yet others carried out advanced
research, which would then be given to other
institutes for development. Often there was
internal competition, with one project being
given to a number of facilities to see who would
come up with the best idea. In its first 15 years
alone, Biopreparat probably cost at least 1.5
billion rubles to create and runa large sum for
life-sciences R&D but relatively modest com-
pared with the cost of nuclear weapons R&D and,
therefore, in terms of strategic weapons,
extremely cost-effective.
The main purpose of the enormous
Biopreparat capability was to hide biological
weapons research, development, and production
formerly carried out solely in Ministry of Defense
establishments behind a facade of nominally
civilian biotechnology and pharmaceutical en-
terprises. The two systems, the former Ministry
of Defense complex of biological weapons
facilities and the new Biopreparat facilities,
continued to operate side-by-side. The Ministry
of Defense facilities themselves probably
employed another 15,000 workers and had a
separate budget, so that the potential within the
system as a whole, which is how it should be
considered, was large and dwarfed the by-then
long-abandoned U.S. offensive program. Its
capacity for production of agent was measured
not in tons but in hundreds of tons for each of at
least nine separate sites, primarily plague,
tularemia, glanders, anthrax, smallpox, and
Venezuelan equine encephalomyelitis.
Another mission of Biopreparat was to apply
advances in biotechnology (genetic engineering,
in particular) to improving the biological
weapons capability of the former Soviet Union.
This mission took several forms, supported
primarily by the then vice-president of the
Academy of Sciences, Yuri Ovchinnikov, the
most influential Soviet biomedical scientist of
the 1970s. He saw a way around arms control
treaties and weapons conventions by using
microbes to produce biologically active sub-
stances that would replace classic chemical
weapons; their production could then be
concealed in the biotechnology or pharmaceuti-
cal industry. He also envisaged that the
government would use genetic engineering to
produce a new generation of biological weapons
agents with enhanced capability for expressing
toxins and other biologically active substances
and to improve overall weapons effectiveness.
The outcome of the first of these two programs is
not known, but the latter was very successful.
Moreover, the new Biopreparat-based program
was able to address all aspects of agent
production and delivery, not just the most
advanced microbiological ones. It built strength
in depth, having as its main aims to improve
industrial production scale-up techniques, mi-
crobial production rates, yields of viable
microorganisms, virulence, and resistance of
microorganisms to antibiotics; to maximize
viability of agent during dissemination and
increased survivability of biological aerosols; and
to enhance the ability of microorganisms to
degrade the targets natural defenses. The
leaders of the program foresaw increasing
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processes into the territory of sovereign states.
Thus, they perceived the need for its weapons to
become invulnerable to first strike or counterat-
tack. Key technical targets associated with such
an approach were the development of dry solid
particulate agent formulations, miniaturized
production facilities, mobile production and
filling facilities, strains resistant to multiple
antibiotics, cruise missile dissemination system,
and combination organisms.
By addressing every aspect of weapon
production, from selection of new strains of
organisms to the behavior of biological aerosols
under every possible condition of climate and
topography, through the genetic engineering of
antibiotic resistance and the design of optimum
dissemination and delivery systems, the former
Soviet Union was able to envisage the
achievement of a miniaturized mobile produc-
tion and weapon-making capability invulnerable
to clandestine monitoring, invasive arms
inspection, or attack in the event of war (because
it was beyond identification); agents precisely
matched to particular scenarios and human
targets and incapable of being treated; a variety
of dissemination systems, including cruise
missiles; agents resistant to degradation by heat,
light, cold, UV radiation, ionizing radiation, and
various antibiotics; and dry formulations of agents
capable of remaining viable in long-term storage.
By the time of the breakup of the former
Soviet Union, from which the Russian Confed-
eration emerged in 1992, much had been
achieved and war mobilization plans were in
place for the surge production of huge quantities
of the agents mentioned earlier, as well as a
number of others, such as Marburg virus. Of
overwhelming importance has been the capabil-
ity to undertake a strategic attack using plague
or smallpox. Intercontinental ballistic missiles
with MIRVed warheads containing plague were
available for launch even before 1985, and SS-11
and SS-18 missiles have been mentioned in this
connection. Concepts of use had been developed
for each of the biological agents formally
accepted into use by the army. For instance, the
principal agents designated as tactical or
operational for use on the battlefield were
tularemia and Venezuelan equine encephalomy-
elitis, whereas anthrax and Marburg virus were
nominated for attacking rear areas. The third
category of agents comprised the highly
transmissible agents smallpox and plague,
which were categorized as strategic weapons and
destined for use against enemy population centers.
What happened after Vladimir Pasechnik
(the former general director of Science Produc-
tion Organisation Farmpribor and director of
The All Union Scientific Research Institute of
Ultra Pure Biopreparations in Leningrad [St.
Petersburg]) defected in 1989 constitutes a long
and complex story, but in January 1991 the first-
ever visit to Biopreparat facilities was under-
taken, by a joint U.K./U.S. technical team, under
a cloak of secrecy. After the subsequent defection
of Kanadjan Alibekov (a former senior deputy
director of Biopreparat) in 1992, the United
States and the United Kingdom were certain
enough that the offensive biological weapons
program was continuing that they challenged
the new Russian regime openly about it as late as
1993. By then substantial changes had taken
place within Biopreparat, and today a concerted
effort is under way to help the Russians
civilianize these former biological weapons R&D
establishments. However, questions remain
about the Russian program: What happened to
the part of the program in Ministry of Defence
facilities that western experts have been unable
to visit? What happened to plans detailing every
aspect of production and deployment? What
happened to the Ovchinnikov bioregulator
program? What happened to the thousands of
personnel involved in the Biopreparat program?
What happened to the R&D centered on
anticrop, antiplant, and antilivestock biological
weapons? What happened to the stocks of seed
cultures of biological weapons agents designed to
be used to fuel the mobilized production of
weapons? Was there space-based biological
weapons capability? Was there any human
genetics-related biological weapons research?
Despite the passage of nearly 10 years, the
fundamental change in political structure of
Russia, the extreme economic upheaval and
budget restrictions, the reorientation of
Biopreparats work, and the help and support
given by the West to civilianize programs and
stop the transfer of technology and scientists into
illegal biological weapons programs, the capabil-
ity of the old Russian Ministry of Defence sites
remains largely unknown.
Iraq
Iraq has stated that its biological weapons
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in great secrecy, after the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention had been signed. The
program was first conducted in an ostensibly
civilian organization called the State Organiza-
tion for Trade and Industry until this was
superseded by the Military Industrial Commis-
sion. As with all other major military programs,
biological weapons R&D was able to call upon
many of its leading scientists who undertook
undergraduate or postgraduate training in the
west. Much of what happened between the
supposed inception of the program in 1974 and
the establishment of a group of biologists within
the Al-Muthanna chemical weapons complex in
1984 is unknown.
In 1987, the Al-Muthanna research group
was transferred to the Al-Salman facility, and
work was expanded to include the investigation
of fungal and antiplant agents; 1988 saw the
establishment of the Al-Hakam Factory, an
industrial-scale production facility designed to
produce anthrax and botulinum toxin for filling
into weapons. This project was completed
quickly by using equipment from nominally
civilian facilities, such as those used to produce
vaccines; the factory itself produced biological
agent, which was filled into weapons and
deployed in late 1990. The program was further
expanded in 1990 when viruses were added to
the range of agents under development and
production capacity was enhanced by the
acquisition and integration of civilian biotech-
nology facilities by the Military Industrial
Commission.
According to the Iraqis, the program was
terminated in 1991, after the adoption of UN
SCR687, and agents, weapons, munitions, and
documents were destroyed. However, the United
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) be-
lieves that from 1991 to 1995 Iraq actively
preserved biological weapons capability.
The Agents, Weapons, and Means of Delivery
The UNSCOM belief that three biological
agents were filled into weapons is supported by
Iraqi statements concerning the filling of
munitions and their deployment ready for
delivery. For one of these agents, Botulinum
toxin, UNSCOM also possesses objective evi-
dence; the other two were probably anthrax and
Clostridium perfringens spores. Approximately
380,000 liters of Botulinum toxin were manufac-
tured, along with 84,250 liters of anthrax spores
and 3,400 liters of C. perfringens spores. In
addition, 2,200 liters of aflatoxin were produced.
All these figures represent preconcentration
totals and may be underestimates. Ricin toxin
and the antiplant agents wheat bunt and corn
smut were also produced. Camel pox is known to
have been under development as well. This
disparate list of biological agents, which at first
seems to contain substances not previously
conceived as potential offensive biological
weapons agents, on closer inspection reveals a
rationale based on the possession of a
multipotent arsenal having lethal, incapacitat-
ing, oncogenic, ethnic, economic, terror, and
variable time-onset capabilities. In addition,
these agents are capable of being used to attack
people through the lungs and the skin, as well as
with carriers such as triethylamine, CN or CS, or
as a toxic coating in fragmentation weapons.
Agents were filled into various weapons for
dissemination. By the end of 1990, according to
Iraqi statements, 25 SCUD/Al-Hussein missiles
were readied for use with biological weapons
warheads (each carrying 145 liters of agent) and
deployed for action. At least 160 R400 retarded
aerial bombs, carrying the distinctive black-
stripe identification around them, may also have
been filled with 90-liter charges of Botulinum
toxin and ready for use. UNSCOM has evidence
to corroborate the Iraqi claim. The Iraqis also
intended to fill R400 bombs with anthrax and
aflatoxin. Originally designed and filled with
chemical agents, 155-mm shells were also tested
with a ricin toxin fill. At least three fuel drop
tanks were completely modified and fitted with
Venturi mechanisms to facilitate aerosol release,
for dispersal of 2,200-liter loads of anthrax and
possibly Botulinum toxin, using F1 aircraft as
the delivery means.
Postscript
UNSCOM has no confidence that Iraq has
abandoned its biological weapons program. The
true scale and scope of the Iraqi biological
weapons program are, despite all UNSCOMs
efforts, still not known.
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